MISSÕES DE PAZ: A DIPLOMACIA BRASILEIRA NOS CONFLITOS INTERNACIONAIS

Coordenação de Raul Mendes Silva

The Ecuador– Peru Peace Process: 1995-1998

Ambassador Ivan Cannabrava
Brazilian Ambassador in Tokyo.
1995-2001 Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

 

Peru and Ecuador show the whole
world today that what makes South America
different is that it is a region of peace. A
region that chooses diplomacy and
international law as the means to
overcome divergences, that chooses
harmonious co-existence as
the passport to modernity.

 These words pronounced by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso on the occasion of the signing of the Global and Definitive Peace Agreement in Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia on 26 October 1998 evoke the deepest significance of that historical ceremony which marked one of the outstanding diplomatic feats of the eight years of his term of office. An end was thus put to a conflict that, given the dimensions and strategic location of the vast geographical area being contested, had represented a secular latent focus of sub-regional instability and continental tension. Caused by one of the most serious war confrontations in South America in half a century, the mediation action performed by the Guarantor Countries of the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States) mobilised in January 1995, for a period of four years, diplomatic efforts on an unprecedented scale in the region and determined the setting up of the first effective multilateral peace operation on the South-American continent. This article endeavours to shed some light on the circumstances and factors that allowed an end to be put to differences that for almost two centuries had thwarted successive attempts at a settlement, even by the Guarantor Countries themselves. Besides being a report of the results achieved, in the last chapter the text will give a brief assessment from the negotiator’s point of view of the various positive forces that contributed towards the success of the process. This analysis will essentially cover the context of the negotiations themselves. The following text therefore closes with the signing of the Global and Definitive Agreement on 26 October 1998, and does not include any developments after that date.

 

Background

This dispute, beginning in the early days of independence, opposed two nations that inherited the fragmentation, in the beginning of the 19th century, of the Spanish Empire in the Americas, which is famous for the imprecision of its internal jurisdiction. This was a question of determining which of these two countries in the process of institutional and territorial consolidation would control the vast and potentially rich lands of the Amazonian “Orient” that stretched as far as the boundaries of the Portuguese-Brazilian Empire. The progressive consolidation of Peruvian penetration and colonisation in the territories under dispute, on account of that country’s greater economic and demographic dynamism, was to aggravate the climate of rivalry and mutual mistrust and fuel the feeling on the Ecuadorian side of having been evicted by its more powerful neighbour.

Since 1860 successive attempts to find a negotiated accommodation proved barren. The failure of the 1890 Herrera-García Treaty (on boundaries) and the arbitration of the King of Spain in 1910 and President Roosevelt in 1938, was characterised by skirmish episodes in the border region. The frustration of these successive negotiations only contributed to forging an antagonistic relationship whose main victim was faith in the possibility of a fair, balanced and definitive solution to the conflict by political-diplomatic means.

The outbreak of the 1941 crisis, as a result of the escalation of one such confrontation, determined the decisive intervention of the traditional mediators who were to become Guarantors (Brazil, Argentina and the United States, later joined by Chile) (1) to terminate a conflict that put in check the cohesion and stability of the hemisphere at a particularly delicate moment – the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942 established as the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border the boundary that to a great extent corresponded to the historical contours of the actual occupation of each country and that had been accepted as the line of military status quo of 1936. Nonetheless, divergences during the demarcation of these boundaries led to Ecuador suspending the works under the allegation that the Protocol: 1) was null and void, as it had been imposed under coercion, since Peruvian troops only vacated all the invaded territories after the signing, and 2) was impractical, since the geographical reality did not correspond to the provisions of its text (2).

Despite the efforts of the Guarantor Countries, it proved impossible for over half a century to overcome the resulting impasse. Ecuador insisted on renegotiating the Protocol, which Peru - afraid that Ecuador intended to reclaim possession of territories (approximately 200,000 square kilometres) that had been in her possession for so long – alleged that it was a legally perfect instrument. Later, bilateral attempts failed to encapsulate the problem in the context of a policy of closer economic and political relations and, following the outbreak of another conflict in 1981, other efforts also failed to reach a lasting military détente in the border zone by means of measures to foster mutual trust.

 

The 1995 Declaration of Peace

The most serious war confrontation between the two countries since 1941 took place in January 1995, when the Protocol was commemorating its 43rd anniversary,. The failure of the measures of mutual trust and the military impasse between the two forces had returned the contention right back to its starting point – rivalry and confrontation.

Ironically, the War of the Upper Cenepa (3) opened an exceptional opportunity to reverse the centuries-old course. It destroyed the complacent presumption that it was possible for the two countries to coexist in a state of permanent pre-belligerence as an alternative to facing the difficult decisions required to reach a definitive solution. Also contributing to this “window of opportunity” identified by the Guarantor Countries was a further dose of pragmatism now permeating the question in both countries. In line with the process of democratic modernisation underway all over the continent, many segments in Peru and Ecuador began to accept the idea that the popular aspirations to economic stability and social modernisation depended on achieving a situation of lasting peace.

These circumstances determined the decision of the Guarantor Countries to condition their offer of good intervention to reach a cease-fire in the region of conflict to the commitment of the two parties to resume negotiations on the issue, for the first time in fifty years.

Accepted in the Itamaraty Declarationof Peacedated 17 February 1995, this agreement was based on serious concessions on both sides: Ecuador admitted the validity of the Protocol in exchange for Peru’s acknowledgement that the conclusion of the demarcation provided for in that instrument first required resolving outstanding matters.

 

The military détente

As a first step, the Declaration envisaged the sending of a peace mission to the region in conflict to supervise the separation of the forces, ensure demilitarisation of the zone and so prevent the risk of fresh hostilities. The Ecuador-Peru Military Observers Mission (MOMEP) went beyond the classic initiatives of fostering mutual trust, such as intensification of contacts between military heads in the area, fraternisation among troops and the creation of a safety primer on the procedures to be followed in cases of fortuitous meetings of opposite forces. Rather than relieve the tension in the area, the MOMEP Staff under Brazilian leadership (4) acted to induce the parties to progressively assume responsibilities for preserving peace and security in the region under conflict.

A crucial element in this strategy was the innovative and courageous decision of the Guarantor Countries to gradually substitute their observers in the MOMEP by contingents of the parties, in order to involve them in the daily tasks of consolidating peace in the area. Despite numerous setbacks, this was the first stage in the “pedagogic” process by which, starting with the military sectors that some few months before had confronted one another on the battle field, the two countries began to overcome their historic rivalry.

In this way, MOMEP played a decisive and fundamental role in establishing a military détente that later made it possible to undertake diplomatic negotiations on the matters in question.

 

The subsistent impasses

With the military situation stabilised, conditions were in place in January 1996 for the Chancellors of both countries to begin to discuss, in the presence of the Guarantor Countries, what would be called “subsistent impasses,” that is, aspects contested by Ecuador concerning the demarcation provided for in the Protocol. The negotiators faced two challenges. First, defining the scope of the controversy . After Ecuador and Peru exchanged, in March that year, lists describing the respective positions, it was the first time that Peru learned officially about the extent of Ecuador’s claims. This provided the security to consider possible future concessions in exchange for a definitive solution. In the second place, an arbitral last-resort mechanism had to be set up for the highly likely hypothesis of not reaching bilateral agreement on the “impasses”. This was only achieved in October with the signing, under the inspiration of the Guarantor Countries, of the Agreement of Santiago, by which the parties agreed that the Guarantors would propose a formula for a solution in case of inseparable divergence. As a result, Ecuador could be confident that her aspirations would be afforded judicious consideration rather than forgotten or once more relegated under the coercion of Peru’s military superiority. In counterpart, Peru was given the assurance that the final solution would be based on technical and objective criteria that respected the validity of the Protocol.

The crucial role of the Guarantor Countries was definitively consolidated as the balance of the negotiating process. They became guarantors not only of the execution of the Protocol but also a radically new acceptation: they were to be guarantors that a formula would be found to carry it out in a satisfactory manner for both sides. Double security was offered: on one hand, the pledge of the Guarantor Countries that solutions would not be imposed; on the other , the adoption, within the sphere of the Agreement ofSantiago, of an ingenious formula by which each partial consensus – on one of the six impasses registered in the lists exchanged in March – would only be validated should all outstanding matters be satisfactorily resolved. By means of this articulated mechanism of a singleundertaking, a dynamics of trust and good faith began that would progressively generate its own solutions and mechanisms of execution.

For the first time since 1942 – albeit in drastically different conditions – Ecuador and Peru established an agenda of discussions without pressures and demands other than those dictated by the desire for peace. The negotiations on the basic questions, scheduled to begin already in 1996, were postponed as a result of the situation of political instability in both countries.

Once these incidents were overcome, a series of meetings were held between April and September that year, when for the first time in half a century technical delegations of the two countries put forward their respective claims on general and detailed bases and were able to react to the theories presented by the other side. Even so, an approximation of positions was still a long way off. For Peru, the Protocol had first to be fully complied with before seeking an accommodation of Ecuador’s aspirations. On the other hand, according to Ecuador the order should be quite the opposite: only after fulfilling the minimum claims of Ecuador on the territorial issue would it be possible to normalise bilateral relations. While Peru was thinking of being generous, Ecuador demanded justice.

 

The change in the axis of the negotiations

Attending to the request for submitting “creative proposals” capable of breaking this impasse, at Brazil’s suggestion the Guarantor Countries drafted a document that argued that it was useless to insist in discussing the impasses in their present format centred on irreconcilable historical positions. The axis of the discussions had to be redirected to transform irreconcilable differences into points of convergence and face bilateral relations no longer as conflictive historic forces but rather from the focus of the potential for peaceful and co-operative living together. The document structured five main themes or fields around which possible joint actions could be identified:

1. Mutual concessions in the area of shipping and trade that met Ecuador’s central claim to access the Amazon river basin in economically feasible conditions. This would also include mutual facilities on port and customs matters, as well as better conditions for navigability in the basin in order to benefit the insertion of both countries in the process of continental economic integration.

2. Initiatives on behalf of bilateral border integration to provide for rational use of shared natural resources through joint administration. Irrigation and highway inter-connection projects would have a special impact on overcoming the economic and social marginalisation that characterises the border regions in both countries.

3. With the resumption and conclusion of the demarcation work, with strictly technical expertise provided in the outstanding stretches, in addition to the possibility, also provided for in the Protocol, of reciprocal territorial concessions to adjust the border line to geographic features.

4. Negotiations towards an agreement on measures to foster mutual trust and security to intensify the work already performed within the sphere of the Bi-national Commission with regard to control and transparency in the area of war arsenals and acquisition of new arms; and

5. Fulfilment by the Guarantor Countries of their responsibilities within the scope of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol and its complementary instruments. In this context they offered to collaborate with friendly countries and international financial and technical institutions to facilitate the projects.

 

The border question

This led to the adoption in January 1998 of the Rio de Janeiro Calendar, which set up bilateral commissions to study each of these questions and a tentative work schedule. Predictably enough, the main difficulties concerned the demarcation issue, because the core question was still outstanding after nearly three years of negotiations: how to assure Peru that the essence of the border drawn by the Protocol would not be contested, while at the same time meet Ecuador’s aspirations. A negotiating framework had to be found that allowed both sides to safeguard their principle-based positions while also showing negotiating flexibility. Judiciously applying a convincing strategy on the various levels of interlocution, the Guarantor Countries helped the parties to re-assess realistically the limits of their respective pretensions. After decanting the maximalist positions, the parties agreed tacitly to suspend temporarily their respective principle-based claims on the border question. In a “constructive ambiguity” exercise, Ecuador refrained from mentioning its higher aspirations (sovereign access to the Maranhão River and questioning 90% of the border already demarcated). In exchange, Peru ceased to publicly demand that the Guarantor Countries should force Ecuador to waive these claims.

The next step was to set up technical-legal groups consisting of representatives from both the Guarantor Countries and the parties to emit recommendations on the minor impasses, in an implicit understanding that the agreements achieved on a set of less controversial areas would create a critical mass to lever the solution to the major impasses.

However, consolidating an agreement on these bases was put in check by a military crisis resulting from mutual accusations of troops infiltrating in demilitarised regions along the common border. This new crisis broke out precisely at the time when the new Ecuadorian President was being sworn in, a ceremony at which the President of Peru was absent. This episode illustrates clearly the biggest challenge facing the peace process: as negotiations advanced and the moment drew near for making politically unpalatable concessions, radical sectors in both countries, discontented at the direction of the negotiations, tried to create problems against a definitive solution. The Presidents had to personally resume the negotiations to weaken the crisis and rekindle talks that were stuck at Chancellor level.(5) The Peace Process had made new hostilities inconceivable; now peace had to be made feasible.

Encouraged by the Guarantor Countries, the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador now held direct bilateral meetings, often in Brasilia, with the participation of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in an effort to find a solution to the remaining crucial impasse: demarcation of the border. Although Ecuador had admitted abandoning her maximalist theses, she demanded some concession in the matter of Tiwintza, a place in the region of the valley of the Upper Cenepa without any special strategic and even less economic value. This was the site of arduous, heroic and above all successful resistance on the part of Ecuadorian forces in 1995, and had become the emblem of the sentiment of national moral resurgence for a country that had always felt at the mercy of more powerful neighbours.

 

The park solution

In order to solve the question, a territorial exchange was conceived by which Ecuador would assign to Peru land in the region of the border equivalent to the area of Tiwintza. In the face of Peruvian resistance, an alternative proposal was made to establish a park or parks around Tiwintza on both sides of the border. These would have the status of ecological reserves, and would therefore be demilitarised and administrated in a co-ordinated fashion. However, negotiations on this formula were hindered by the lack of an agreement on some highly symbolic details. Fearing an “internationalisation” of its territory, Peru resisted Ecuador’s idea that the park be made a single unit, that is, without any physical demarcation of the border as confirmed in the technical-legal opinions, and with a common administration.

Despite the maturity achieved in the personal dialogue between both parties, this divergence proved insurmountable. Nonetheless, a definitive solution had to be found because of the risk of fresh hostilities breaking out in the vacuum caused by the frustration of the expectations generated by this highly visible diplomatic exercise and by the indefinite prolongation of the peace process. Once again in the spirit of the Agreement of Santiago, in a letter dated 8 October, Ecuador and Peru resorted to the Guarantor Countries to request that a proposal be presented to solve this last impasse. In an answer given on 10 October, the Guarantor Countries agreed to the petition, but under the condition that the formula that was proposed would be approved beforehand by the two countries.

Following the two parliaments’ consent to this procedure, by a large margin, the solution conceived by the Guarantor Countries was announced on 23 October. In essence, the solution validated the technical-legal opinions (which only then were made public). With regard to Tiwintza, however, a special regime was provided whereby Peru was to transfer to Ecuador the patrimonial possession – but not the sovereignty – of one square kilometre of territory around this locality.

In the wake of the generally favourable reaction in both countries, a ceremony for the signing of the Presidential Minute was held in Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia on 26 October. Peace between the two countries was sealed with a series of bilateral agreements that consecrated the commitments settled in the commissions set up by the Rio de Janeiro Calendar on the matter of furthering mutual trust, border integration and shipping and trade.

 

The Guarantee

The highest merit of the peace process conducted by the Guarantor Countries was to create a process of patient “construction” or “induction” of peace in the wake of a long history of frustrated negotiations. The negotiations capitalised in their favour the international context marked by the intensification of the process of regional integration and the growing awareness in Peru and Ecuador that a political-diplomatic solution was the only way out of the dispute. This very important fact greatly increased the engagement of Peruvians and Ecuadorians in seeking creative solutions to the conflict.

They were thus able to maximise the catalysing potential of the window of opportunity that opened with the military impasse caused by the War of the Upper Cenepa and heightened by the military crisis of July 1998. By acting in a pragmatic and prudent manner, the Guarantor Countries explored the multiple combinations of convincing formulas within the Latin-American diplomatic arsenal to foster dynamics of dialogue and trust between the parties. By resorting to various channels of interlocution, they calibrated and guided their interventions to progressively redirect the dialogue. Accordingly, the Guarantee scored a great victory by making the Protocol not look like an instrument imposed by the verdict of the 1941 War, in order to consolidate the agreement to seek lasting and mutually acceptable peace. The Guarantee became an instrument of conciliation and mediation, thereby acquiring its modern role as an auxiliary instrument for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in the terms of paragraph 1, Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.(6)

From the regional point of view, the success of the Guarantee expresses the maturing of the hemispheric system and the avenues opened for harmonious integration of the region within the architecture of global collective security. The success of the peace process is the accomplishment of Latin America’s commitment to promote regional solutions to regional problems, coherent with the project of democratic consolidation and economic integration now underway in Latin America,. The action of MOMEP served to underscore the central role assigned to the Armed Forces in pursuing this objective. As an example of operations on behalf of the political-diplomatic process of settling disputes peacefully, MOMEP contributed to consolidate a new paradigm for the role of the military sector as an instrument of fostering and promoting peace in fully redemocratised societies. Rather than a mere instrument interposed between adversary forces, the mission of observers acted as a temporary decompression chamber for the tensions in the zone of conflict and consequently as an important factor in the strategy to make the negotiations dynamic.

The mediator is responsible for helping to induce the necessary political will by exploiting circumstances that are that emphasise the advantages of pursuing a definitive solution and preventing the inherent difficulties from being a pretext for alleged lack of political conditions to make progress. The success of the Guarantor Countries and their military ally, MOMEP, is an example of this determination combined with a pragmatic assessment of existing minimum conditions for the mediator to act. What it presents is not – nor could it be – a closed and finished scheme, principally because its greatest virtue lies in its flexibility and malleability. A decisive element in this context was the collegiate  action of the Guarantor Countries. Consultations and regular meetings in the various locations made it possible to develop co-ordinated and cohesive actions between countries with great discrepancies in relative power, unequal relations with the adversary and sometimes divergent national interests and strategic views. Joint planning and concerted execution ensured a harmonious action that allowed the mediators the impartiality and credibility necessary for their double mission as arbiters of impasses and persuaders to settlement.

Brazil's role and the regional context

During the peace process, Brazil was not only a channel for co-ordination between the Guarantor Countries and interlocution with the parties, which are tasks assigned to it as depository of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol. The initiative taken by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to sponsor a high-level round of negotiations to overcome the latest obstacles to an agreement illustrate how Brazilian diplomacy progressively assumed the role of leader in the pursuit of a final solution to the conflict.

This engagement was based on a view of the reconciliation between Ecuador and Peru as an important watershed in the region’s efforts to face and solve its problems in a regional manner. Brazil was aware of the decisive impulse that eliminating this focus of instability and tension in the Amazon region would represent for the efforts to boost regional co-operation on behalf of the social and economic development of all South American nations.

At this juncture it is appropriate to highlight aspects of the Brazilian view of the negotiating process and to underline elements, some of which were pointed out earlier, that converged towards creating a favourable atmosphere for settling the dispute.

In the first place, it is important to stress the perception by both countries that the peace process would be beneficial for all and that solving rather than prolonging the crisis would, therefore, be much more advantageous. Besides political considerations, economic incentives and regional integration were some of the points that made the option for peace more attractive. Public opinion in Peru and Ecuador now swung more in favour of peace and to help remove the underlying mistrust and resentment that only intensified the diverging views of the negotiators. Brazil used this to advantage in exploring, together with the other Guarantors, all possibilities for a peace agreement. The perception of the benefits of peace – genuinely accepted, let it be repeated, by Peru and Ecuador – enabled the Brazilian leadership of the process to work along the line that there were neither winners nor losers and that it was fundamental, in the course of the talks, for both sides to forget the other as a source of threat and rivalry.

A word is called for in praise of the quality of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian contribution to the process. The more progress was advanced, the more the creativity, ingenuity and constructive spirit displayed by the negotiators on both sides, without whom there could hardly have been a peace process. And it is likewise true that the involvement of Peru and Ecuador in the process became all the deeper and more irreversible as the parties now clearly understood how impartial the exercise was. The use of subjective criteria was rejected; only objective bases (opinions) were admissible. In a virtuous circle that encouraged trust in the process, the Guarantor Countries gave proof after proof that they had no intention of favouring either of the countries for being stronger, or else compensating the other for being the more vulnerable – the exercise had to be rigorous, clear and transparent. If there was to be any "concession" for the sake of higher interests, this would have to be at the initiative of the parties and never imposed by the Guarantors.

Similarly, there was an extraordinary contribution from both sides in the military sphere. This was particularly significant in the light of the armed confrontations of 1995. The same military authorities who commanded opposing trenches realised the importance of peace, and contributed greatly to the beginning of a process of détente.

Also in the military area, the realisation that the action developed by MOMEP was effective, creative and innovative. The work of the Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean and North-American military personnel in conjunction with Peruvians and Ecuadorians was instrumental for the satisfactory advance of the political-diplomatic discussions. Brazil’s leadership assured MOMEP of firm and competent action always attuned to the political negotiations. In the delicate and fundamental tasks of separating forces and military détente, MOMEP won the respect of the parties and achieved highly positive results, being acknowledged as one of the most successful peace missions ever.

Also essential for the consolidation of peace was the innovative architecture of the negotiations and the particular format of the role played by the Guarantor Countries. It has to be admitted that the fluidity of the internal relationship of the Guarantor Countries contributed greatly towards the development of the negotiations. They acted as a cohesive harmonious group, performing a collective work in unison. Even though this was a heterogeneous group, which included the presence of a super-power, and although at times the countries made different evaluations, understanding prevailed. Brazil was seen throughout the whole process as "co-ordinator," but at no time did it attempt to impose its points of view; all the positions adopted by the Guarantor Countries were agreed on a consensual basis.

In order to create the psychological leverage indispensable for the success of such a delicate exercise, it was decided to move ahead quickly in the less controversial questions in order to create, as mentioned earlier, a critical mass for the solution of the real impasses. When the time came to address them, the document proposed by Brazil omitted none of the themes, however thorny they might be, and in order to avoid past mistakes tried to use the Ecuadorian and Peruvian postulates as much as possible. The decision to include the five major topics of negotiation in a single document gave the parties a broad appreciation of the set of questions and interests at stake and allowed them favourable dynamics to overcome the main impasses. This was the spirit and format of the document delivered by the Brazilian Chancellor to the representatives of Peru and Ecuador. The guarantee of a singleundertaking permitted the parties continuous engagement without the fear that important points of their interests might not be given due consideration.

All channels were used to promote the negotiations. One worthy of note was the role of the Embassies of the Guarantor Countries in Lima and Quito, who were in charge of specific tasks and kept "finely tuned" with the negotiations. The action of the Embassies of the Guarantor Countries in the respective capitals helped to create a sensation of continuity in the talks and allowed the litigant parties an interlocution that was privileged, easily accessible, impartial and clear.

The Guarantor Countries also endeavoured, with a certain dose of risk as to what this represented in respect to their original role, to follow a path to induce peace. This guideline was adopted to prevent the rigid moulds imposed by the Rio de Janeiro Protocol from turning the Guarantor Countries into mere spectators of a cycle of accusations and denial of reciprocal rights between the parties. At certain moments of the negotiations this situation began to appear possible, but this was immediately circumvented by the decisive action of the Guarantor Countries. It should also be pointed out that in certain difficult phases of the exercise, the negotiations were carried out with the parties in separate rooms. In order to effectively incentivise peace, however, it was necessary to do more than just take the parties to the same room; they had to be helped to see beyond immediate obstacles, visualise points of convergence and construct their own solutions to the impasses.

As a final consideration, it is only fair to pay tribute to the personal zeal shown by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his Chancellor Luiz Felipe Lampreia. At every stage in the process, both of them maintained their sense of balance, their view of the whole and foresight. It is no exaggeration to say that on more than one occasion the process could have derailed were it not for the personal intervention of President Cardoso with his peers to convince them of the historical responsibility they all shared. This task entailed not only argument and persuasion, which have always been perfectly employed by Minister Lampreia, but also an extraordinary dialogue between regional leaders and a degree of credibility that came both from personal merits (including a dedication to the cause that surprised and engaged the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador) and from the respect for the role played by Brazil in the South-American scenario.

NOTES

1. Chile joined the mediators during the negotiations of the Protocol.
2. Ecuador alleged that a “geographical mistake” contained in the Protocol made it impossible to define a stretch of the border, since in its opinion this would be based on a watershed that did not exist.
3. The valley of the Cenepa River corresponds to the region whose demarcation Ecuador considered impossible because of the “geographical mistake”.
4. As co-ordinator of the Guarantor Countries, Brazil was responsible for appointing the Generals, normally substituted every six months, who presided over the work of the General Staff.
5. This agreement, intermediated by MOMEP, was sealed by President Fujimori in the Planalto Palace, where he had gone to ask for President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s support to a solution. His instructions to make the Peruvian demands in this matter more flexible contributed to the downfall a few days later of the Peruvian Chancellor Eduardo Ferrera, who defended a less conciliatory stance.
6. “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first and foremost, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.”

(Translated by JM)


26 October 1968, six Latin-American Presidents gather in Brasilia to attend
the historical peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru


President Fernando Henrique (right) is received by Ambassador Luiz Felipe de
Seixas Corrêa, Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs





Brasilia, 7 October 1998. Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador, arrives at
the capital to sign the peace agreement with Peru




Participants in the seminar "International Crime Tribunal." In the centre, Ambassador
Ivan Cannabrava, one of the main sponsors of the peace process between Ecuador and Peru




7 October 1998. Gathered in Brasilia for the signing of the peace agreement,
from the left, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, Chancellor
Luiz felipe Lampreia and Ecuadorian President Jamil Mahuad